Do markets penalize agency conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders? Evidence from Chile

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dc.contributor.authorLefort, Fernando
dc.contributor.authorWalker, Eduardo
dc.date.accessioned2024-01-10T12:38:25Z
dc.date.available2024-01-10T12:38:25Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.description.abstractUsing a sample of Chilean listed firms with widespread presence of economic conglomerates that use pyramid structures to control affiliated companies, we find that firms where controlling shareholders have higher coincidence between cash and control rights are persistently more valued by the market. We carefully check that our results are not driven by omitted variable biases and control for reverse causation using a feature of Chilean Corporations Law that provides an exogenous instrument for ownership concentration.
dc.fechaingreso.objetodigital2024-05-14
dc.format.extent32 páginas
dc.fuente.origenWOS
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1746-1049.2007.00044.x
dc.identifier.issn0012-1533
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-1049.2007.00044.x
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/77040
dc.identifier.wosidWOS:000248595100002
dc.information.autorucEscuela de Administración;Lefort F;S/I;80348
dc.information.autorucEscuela de Administración;Walker E;S/I;59879
dc.issue.numero3
dc.language.isoen
dc.nota.accesocontenido parcial
dc.pagina.final314
dc.pagina.inicio283
dc.publisherBLACKWELL PUBLISHING
dc.revistaDEVELOPING ECONOMIES
dc.rightsacceso restringido
dc.subjectagency conflicts
dc.subjectcorporate governance
dc.subjectconglomerates
dc.subjectChile
dc.subjectBUSINESS GROUPS
dc.subjectCORPORATE GOVERNANCE
dc.subjectEMERGING MARKETS
dc.subjectOWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
dc.subjectEQUITY
dc.subjectPERFORMANCE
dc.subjectPOLICY
dc.titleDo markets penalize agency conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders? Evidence from Chile
dc.typeartículo
dc.volumen45
sipa.codpersvinculados80348
sipa.codpersvinculados59879
sipa.indexWOS
sipa.indexScopus
sipa.trazabilidadCarga SIPA;09-01-2024
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