THE BROTHER-IN-LAW EFFECT

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dc.contributor.authorLevine, David K.
dc.contributor.authorWeinschelbaum, Federico
dc.contributor.authorZurita, Felipe
dc.date.accessioned2025-01-21T00:06:01Z
dc.date.available2025-01-21T00:06:01Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.description.abstractWhen a firm is forced to pay abnormally high wages, hiring transfers rents. This effectively endows the employer with the ability to grant favors, and he may wish to do so even at some cost to efficient production. We refer to this as the brother-in-law effect. This article analyzes its consequences. When the brother-in-law effect is due to unionization, decisions regarding both the number and type of workers employed could be inefficient; overemployment could obtain even relative to the workforce that would be employed without unionization. We also identify cases in which nepotism improves efficiency.
dc.description.funderDirect For Social, Behav & Economic Scie; Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences
dc.fuente.origenWOS
dc.identifier.eissn1468-2354
dc.identifier.issn0020-6598
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/95572
dc.identifier.wosidWOS:000277919100010
dc.issue.numero2
dc.language.isoen
dc.pagina.final507
dc.pagina.inicio497
dc.revistaInternational economic review
dc.rightsacceso restringido
dc.subject.ods10 Reduced Inequality
dc.subject.odspa10 Reducción de las desigualdades
dc.titleTHE BROTHER-IN-LAW EFFECT
dc.typeartículo
dc.volumen51
sipa.indexWOS
sipa.trazabilidadWOS;2025-01-12
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