When Congress Prevails: Veto Overrides and Legislative Fragmentation in Multiparty Legislatures

Simple item page
dc.catalogadoraba
dc.contributor.authorValdivieso Kastner, Pablo
dc.contributor.authorHuertas Hernández, Sergio Alfonso
dc.date.accessioned2024-09-13T15:29:25Z
dc.date.available2024-09-13T15:29:25Z
dc.date.issued2024
dc.description.abstractThis study delves into the determinants of legislative overrides in multiparty legislatures, with a specific focus on the influence of partisan fragmentation within congress. Utilizing an original dataset spanning from 1995 to 2017, we examine the cases of Ecuador and Peru. Our argument posits that during lawmaking, a dispersed and fragmented party system prevents the president from anticipating the preferences of the congressional pivotal party. In such a scenario of incomplete information, the president’s capacity to introduce selective incentives through vetoes is limited. In this way, the president is less likely to break the congressional majority supporting a bill. Consequently, the vetoed bill becomes less acceptable compared to the original statute. This, in turn, provides the congressional majority with increased incentives to uphold the original bill, elevating the likelihood of a legislative override. In alignment with this rationale, our findings indicate that an increase in the effective number of parties (ENP) has a positive and significant impact on the probability of a legislative override. Additionally, our evidence underscores a noteworthy contrast between the relatively high rate of legislative overrides in Latin America and findings for the US case.
dc.fechaingreso.objetodigital2024-09-13
dc.fuente.origenORCID
dc.identifier.doi10.1177/10659129241268822
dc.identifier.eissn1938-274X
dc.identifier.issn1065-9129
dc.identifier.scopusid2-s2.0-85199966154
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1177/10659129241268822
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/87871
dc.identifier.wosidWOS:001278027500001
dc.information.autorucInstituto de Ciencia Política; Huertas Hernández, Sergio Alfonso; 0000-0002-2697-3068; 1139375
dc.language.isoen
dc.nota.accesocontenido completo
dc.pagina.final17
dc.pagina.inicio1
dc.revistaPolitical Research Quarterly
dc.rightsacceso abierto
dc.rights.licenseAttribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
dc.subjectLegislative override
dc.subjectEffective number of parties
dc.subjectEcuador
dc.subjectPerú
dc.subject.ddc320
dc.subject.deweyCiencias políticases_ES
dc.subject.ods16 Peace, justice and strong institutions
dc.subject.odspa16 Paz, justicia e instituciones sólidas
dc.titleWhen Congress Prevails: Veto Overrides and Legislative Fragmentation in Multiparty Legislatures
dc.typeartículo
sipa.codpersvinculados1139375
sipa.trazabilidadORCID;2024-08-19
Files
Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
valdivieso-kastner-huertas-hernandez-2024-when-congress-prevails-veto-overrides-and-legislative-fragmentation-in.pdf
Size:
1.15 MB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Description:
Download
Collections
Artículos de revistas