Matching with floor constraints

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dc.contributor.authorAkin, Sumeyra
dc.date.accessioned2025-01-20T22:02:36Z
dc.date.available2025-01-20T22:02:36Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.description.abstractFloor constraints are a prominent feature of many matching markets, such as medical residency, teacher assignment, and military cadet matching. We develop a theory of matching markets under floor constraints. We introduce a stability notion, which we call floor respecting stability, for markets in which (hard) floor constraints must be respected. A matching is floor respecting stable if there is no coalition of doctors and hospitals that can propose an alternative matching that is feasible and an improvement for its members. Our stability notion imposes the additional condition that a coalition cannot reassign a doctor outside the coalition to another hospital (although she can be fired). This condition is necessary to guarantee the existence of stable matchings. We provide a mechanism that is strategy-proof for doctors and implements a floor respecting stable matching.
dc.fuente.origenWOS
dc.identifier.doi10.3982/TE3785
dc.identifier.eissn1555-7561
dc.identifier.issn1933-6837
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.3982/TE3785
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/93991
dc.identifier.wosidWOS:000751910200007
dc.issue.numero3
dc.language.isoen
dc.pagina.final942
dc.pagina.inicio911
dc.revistaTheoretical economics
dc.rightsacceso restringido
dc.subjectMatching
dc.subjectfloor constraints
dc.subjectefficiency
dc.subjectstability
dc.subjectstrategy-proofness
dc.titleMatching with floor constraints
dc.typeartículo
dc.volumen16
sipa.indexWOS
sipa.trazabilidadWOS;2025-01-12
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