Asymmetric partnerships

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dc.contributor.authorFigueroa, Nicolas
dc.contributor.authorSkreta, Vasiliki
dc.date.accessioned2025-01-20T23:58:23Z
dc.date.available2025-01-20T23:58:23Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.description.abstractWe study asymmetric partnerships and show that efficient dissolution is possible if critical types (where participation constraints bind) are equal. Ownership structures guaranteeing equal critical types always exist, but can be extremely unequal. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
dc.fuente.origenWOS
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.083
dc.identifier.eissn1873-7374
dc.identifier.issn0165-1765
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.083
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/95247
dc.identifier.wosidWOS:000303177600035
dc.issue.numero2
dc.language.isoen
dc.pagina.final271
dc.pagina.inicio268
dc.revistaEconomics letters
dc.rightsacceso restringido
dc.subjectEfficient mechanism design
dc.subjectOwnership structure
dc.subjectPartnerships
dc.subject.ods10 Reduced Inequality
dc.subject.odspa10 Reducción de las desigualdades
dc.titleAsymmetric partnerships
dc.typeartículo
dc.volumen115
sipa.indexWOS
sipa.trazabilidadWOS;2025-01-12
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