State-Dependent Attention and Pricing Decisions

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dc.contributor.authorTuren, Javier
dc.date.accessioned2025-01-20T20:14:42Z
dc.date.available2025-01-20T20:14:42Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies price-setting decisions under rational inatten-tion. Prices are set by tracking an unobserved target whose distri-bution is also unknown. Information acquisition is dynamic and fully flexible since, given information acquired previously, price setters choose the amount of information they collect as well as how they want to learn about both the outcome and its distribu-tion. We show that by allowing for imperfect information to be the unique source of rigidity, the model can reconcile stylized facts in the microeconomic evidence on price setting while simultaneously being consistent with empirical results on state-dependent attention. (JEL D21, D82, D83, E32, L11, L25)
dc.description.funderFondecyt-Anid
dc.fuente.origenWOS
dc.identifier.doi10.1257/mac.20210038
dc.identifier.eissn1945-7715
dc.identifier.issn1945-7707
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1257/mac.20210038
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/92214
dc.identifier.wosidWOS:000974894700006
dc.issue.numero2
dc.language.isoen
dc.pagina.final189
dc.pagina.inicio161
dc.revistaAmerican economic journal-macroeconomics
dc.rightsacceso restringido
dc.subject.ods17 Partnerships for the Goals
dc.subject.ods08 Decent Work and Economic Growth
dc.subject.odspa17 Alianzas para lograr los objetivos
dc.subject.odspa08 Trabajo decente y crecimiento económico
dc.titleState-Dependent Attention and Pricing Decisions
dc.typeartículo
dc.volumen15
sipa.indexWOS
sipa.trazabilidadWOS;2025-01-12
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