Funding Contagion through Common Owners

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dc.contributor.authorLarrain, Borja
dc.contributor.authorSertsios, Giorgo
dc.contributor.authorUrzua I, Francisco
dc.date.accessioned2025-01-20T20:07:32Z
dc.date.available2025-01-20T20:07:32Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.description.abstractFunding contagion is the impaired ability of a firm to raise external funds when negative shocks hit other firms under the same owner. We study this possibility with pairs of private firms in unrelated industries that share a large common shareholder. We find that a firm's debt growth and financial leverage go down when the partner firm experiences negative shocks. Our results are consistent with creditors contracting the credit supply because of cash flow cross-pledging between related firms. Funding contagion increases when control rights are strong, and the credit market is less developed. (JEL G30, G32) Received: February 17, 2021; Editorial decision: July 18, 2023 by Editor: Andrew Ellul. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
dc.fuente.origenWOS
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/rcfs/cfad019
dc.identifier.eissn2046-9136
dc.identifier.issn2046-9128
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfad019
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/91815
dc.identifier.wosidWOS:001050242800001
dc.language.isoen
dc.revistaReview of corporate finance studies
dc.rightsacceso restringido
dc.titleFunding Contagion through Common Owners
dc.typeartículo
sipa.indexWOS
sipa.trazabilidadWOS;2025-01-12
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