Playing Stackelberg Security Games in perfect formulations

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dc.article.number103068
dc.catalogadorgjm
dc.contributor.authorBustamante Faúndez, Pamela Alejandra
dc.contributor.authorBucarey L., Víctor
dc.contributor.authorLabbé, Martine
dc.contributor.authorMarianov Kluge, Vladimir
dc.contributor.authorOrdoñez, Fernando
dc.date.accessioned2024-03-13T20:14:23Z
dc.date.available2024-03-13T20:14:23Z
dc.date.issued2024
dc.description.abstractProtecting critical infrastructure from intentional damage requires foreseeing the strategies of possible attackers. We formulate this problem as a Stackelberg Security Game. A defender must decide which specific targets to protect with limited resources, thus maximizing their expected utility (e.g., minimizing damage value) and considering that a second player (or players), called an attacker, responds in the best possible way. Since Stackelberg Security Games are generally NP-hard, the main challenge in finding optimal strategies in real applications is to develop efficient methodologies for large instances. We propose a general methodology to find a Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium for Stackelberg Security Games, exploiting the structure in the defender’s strategy set. This methodology consists of two steps. First, we formulate the problem by using variables representing the probability of defending each target. The formulation must be either a polynomial-size MILP and/or an MILP with an exponential number of constraints that are separable in polynomial time through branch-and-cut. In the second step, we recover the mixed strategies in the original space efficiently (in polynomial time) by using column generation. We apply this methodology to various security applications studied in the last decade. We generalize known examples and propose new examples. Finally, we provide an extensive computational study of the various formulations based on marginal probabilities.
dc.fechaingreso.objetodigital2024-09-05
dc.format.extent34 páginas
dc.fuente.origenORCID
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.omega.2024.103068
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.omega.2024.103068
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/84383
dc.identifier.wosidWOS:001216364400001
dc.information.autorucEscuela de Ingeniería; Bustamante Faúndez, Pamela Alejandra; S/I; 1092275
dc.information.autorucEscuela de Ingeniería; Marianov Kluge, Vladimir; 0000-0002-5343-0106; 99349
dc.language.isoen
dc.nota.accesocontenido parcial
dc.revistaOmega
dc.rightsacceso restringido
dc.subjectOR in defense
dc.subjectBilevel optimization
dc.subjectPolyhedral structure
dc.subjectStackelberg Games
dc.subject.ddc620
dc.subject.deweyIngenieríaes_ES
dc.titlePlaying Stackelberg Security Games in perfect formulations
dc.typepreprint
sipa.codpersvinculados1092275
sipa.codpersvinculados99349
sipa.trazabilidadORCID;2024-03-04
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