Novel valid inequalities and branch-and-price for Stackelberg security games

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dc.catalogadorjca
dc.contributor.authorBustamante Faúndez, Pamela
dc.contributor.authorBucarey L., Víctor
dc.contributor.authorLabbé, Martine
dc.contributor.authorMarianov, Vladimir
dc.contributor.authorOrdoñez, Fernando
dc.date.accessioned2025-06-27T13:22:05Z
dc.date.available2025-06-27T13:22:05Z
dc.date.issued2025
dc.description.abstractAnticipating the strategies of potential attackers is crucial for protecting critical infrastructure. We can represent the challenge of the defenders of such infrastructure as a Stackelberg security game. The defender must decide how to allocate limited resources to protect specific targets, aiming to maximize their expected utility (such as minimizing the extent of damage) and considering that attackers will respond in a way that is most advantageous to them. We present novel valid inequalities to find a Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium in both Stackelberg games and Stackelberg security games. We also consider a Stackelberg security game that aims to protect targets with a defined budget. We use branch-and-price in this game to show that our approach outperforms the standard formulation in the literature, in terms of both solution speed and memory usage. Additionally, we present an extensive computational study to assess the impact of various parameters in branch-and-price, such as the number of initial columns, the number of columns generated per iteration, and the effects of stabilization techniques. The results show that our approach reduces the solution time of the problem to less than a fifth of the time required by the state-of-the art methods.
dc.format.extent14 páginas
dc.fuente.origenORCID
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.cor.2025.107122
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cor.2025.107122
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/104775
dc.information.autorucEscuela de Ingeniería; Marianov Kluge, Vladimir; 0000-0002-5343-0106; 99349
dc.information.autorucEscuela de Ingeniería; Bustamante Faúndez, Pamela; S/I; 1092275
dc.language.isoen
dc.nota.accesocontenido parcial
dc.rightsacceso restringido
dc.subjectGame theory
dc.subjectStackelberg games
dc.subjectStackelberg security games
dc.subjectOptimization
dc.subject.ddc000
dc.subject.deweyCiencias de la computaciónes_ES
dc.titleNovel valid inequalities and branch-and-price for Stackelberg security games
dc.typeartículo
sipa.codpersvinculados99349
sipa.codpersvinculados1092275
sipa.trazabilidadORCID;2025-06-23
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