The Benefit of the Doubt: Patent Examination Under Strategic Obfuscation

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dc.contributor.authorFigueroa, Nicolas
dc.contributor.authorLemus, Jorge
dc.date.accessioned2025-01-20T17:11:33Z
dc.date.available2025-01-20T17:11:33Z
dc.date.issued2024
dc.description.abstractAn applicant privately observes the value of an idea and files a patent application. After the examination, the patent examiner may not find conclusive evidence of the idea's value. In this case, granting a patent can be the right decision or a mistake. Moreover, it can prompt obfuscation-effort to disrupt communication-by the applicant, reducing allocative efficiency. We show there is more obfuscation when examiners are more lenient, and we provide an empirical exercise supporting this conclusion. We also show that more examination resources do not prevent and may lead to more obfuscation. This result continues to hold when applicants can invest in knowledge to increase their chances of having good ideas. We also show that there is less obfuscation when good ideas are harder to find.
dc.description.funderANID PIA/APOYO
dc.fuente.origenWOS
dc.identifier.doi10.1287/mnsc.2023.00140
dc.identifier.eissn1526-5501
dc.identifier.issn0025-1909
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.00140
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/91191
dc.identifier.wosidWOS:001088468700001
dc.issue.numero9
dc.language.isoen
dc.pagina.final5870
dc.pagina.inicio5853
dc.revistaManagement science
dc.rightsacceso restringido
dc.subjectobfuscation
dc.subjectstrategic communication
dc.subjectpatents
dc.subjectpatent examination
dc.titleThe Benefit of the Doubt: Patent Examination Under Strategic Obfuscation
dc.typeartículo
dc.volumen70
sipa.indexWOS
sipa.trazabilidadWOS;2025-01-12
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