Multiple Equilibria in Oligopolistic Power Markets with Feed-in Tariff Incentives for Renewable Energy Generation

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dc.contributor.authorSauma Santis, Enzo Enrique
dc.contributor.authorPérez de Arce Jeria, Miguel Felipe
dc.contributor.authorContreras, J.
dc.date.accessioned2022-05-13T19:15:19Z
dc.date.available2022-05-13T19:15:19Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.description.abstractDifferent policies have been implemented to incentivize the development of renewable energy generation. One of these policies is the feed-in tariff mechanism. When evaluating this policy, the typical approach is to look at the social welfare and the carbon emission reductions obtained in the optimal dispatch solution. However, in the context of oligopolistic competition in power markets, multiple market equilibria may take place. Under such a paradigm, there is generally no information about the consequences of actually occurring an equilibrium that is different than the one obtained from the optimization algorithm. Thus, a relevant question is whether the implementation of a feed-in-tariff policy decreases social welfare for all possible market equilibria or not. This paper analyzes the existence of multiple equilibria within the context of oligopolistic competition in power markets and studies the social welfare resulting in each one of them. We find that there may be equilibria for which the feed-in tariff policy increases social welfare, but also there may be equilibria for which this policy reduces social welfare. Moreover, carbon emission reductions vary from equilibrium to equilibrium, significantly varying the cost-effectiveness of the feed-in-tariff policy in reducing emissions.
dc.fuente.origenIEEE
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/HICSS.2015.305
dc.identifier.isbn978-1479973675
dc.identifier.issn1530-1605
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1109/HICSS.2015.305
dc.identifier.urihttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=7070120
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/63885
dc.identifier.wosidWOS:000366264102083
dc.information.autorucEscuela de ingeniería ; Sauma Santis, Enzo Enrique ; S/I ; 74184
dc.information.autorucEscuela de ingeniería ; Pérez de Arce Jeria, Miguel Felipe ; S/I ; 79990
dc.language.isoen
dc.nota.accesoContenido parcial
dc.publisherIEEE
dc.relation.ispartofHawaii International Conference on System Sciences (48° : 2015 : Kauai, HI, Estados Unidos)
dc.rightsacceso restringido
dc.subjectISO
dc.subjectPower markets
dc.subjectGreen products
dc.subjectAvailability
dc.subjectPower generation
dc.subjectPower transmission lines
dc.subjectInvestment
dc.subject.ods01 No poverty
dc.subject.odspa01 Fin de la pobreza
dc.titleMultiple Equilibria in Oligopolistic Power Markets with Feed-in Tariff Incentives for Renewable Energy Generationes_ES
dc.typecomunicación de congreso
sipa.codpersvinculados74184
sipa.codpersvinculados79990
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