Ramsey Pricing Revisited: Natural Monopoly Regulation With Evaders

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dc.catalogadoryvc
dc.contributor.authorBesfamille, Martin
dc.contributor.authorFigueroa, N.
dc.contributor.authorGuzmán‐Lizardo, L.
dc.date.accessioned2025-07-10T22:08:29Z
dc.date.available2025-07-10T22:08:29Z
dc.date.issued2025
dc.description.abstractWe consider a model featuring a single-product natural monopoly, which faces evaders, that is, individuals who may not pay the price. By exerting costly effort, the firm can deter evasion. To maximize total surplus, a regulator sets the price, the level of deterrence effort, and socially costly transfers to ensure the monopoly's participation. We obtain a modified Ramsey formula, which clearly shows that the mere existence of evaders dampens the use of the price as a means to finance the firm's deficit. The regulated price is always below the monopoly price and, under sufficient conditions, also below marginal cost. We find conditions under which the regulated price decreases if society departs from fully crediting evaders' utilities to welfare. Then, we generalize the model to incorporate moral hazard.
dc.description.funderComplex Engineering Systems Institute (CONICYT-PIA-FB0816); CAF-Banco de Desarrollo de América Latina; Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (PID2022-137707NB-I00) funded by MICIU/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and FEDER, UE.
dc.fuente.origenORCID
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/joie.70004
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1111/joie.70004
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/104919
dc.information.autorucInstituto de Economía; Besfamille, Martín; 0000-0002-4073-3466; 1013292
dc.language.isoen
dc.nota.accesocontenido parcial
dc.rightsacceso restringido
dc.subject.ddc300
dc.subject.deweyCiencias socialeses_ES
dc.subject.ods08 Decent work and economic growth
dc.subject.ods12 Responsible consumption and production
dc.subject.odspa12 Producción y consumo responsables
dc.subject.odspa08 Trabajo decente y crecimiento económico
dc.titleRamsey Pricing Revisited: Natural Monopoly Regulation With Evaders
dc.typeartículo
sipa.codpersvinculados1013292
sipa.trazabilidadORCID;2025-07-07
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