Manipulability of Cost and Benefit Allocation in Cross-border Electrical Interconnection Projects

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dc.contributor.authorChurkin, A.
dc.contributor.authorPozo, David
dc.contributor.authorBialek, J.
dc.contributor.authorKorgin, N.
dc.contributor.authorSauma Santis, Enzo Enrique
dc.date.accessioned2022-05-16T20:30:51Z
dc.date.available2022-05-16T20:30:51Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.description.abstractCross-border electrical interconnection projects are getting more attention all over the world. In this context, cost-benefit allocation is especially important due to the need for fair sharing of power trading benefits among the countries as well as allocating the investments in capital-intensive power lines. One convenient way of dealing with these issues is using cooperative game theory. However, even fair allocation methods, such as the Shapley value, do not guarantee the stability of negotiations on cross-border interconnection projects. The result of the allocation process strongly depends on the individual system's data provided by each party involved. In this regard, the parties could have incentives to strategically provide data that would benefit themselves in the cost-benefit allocation process, potentially hindering the stability of the coalition. In this paper, we address the negotiation stability issues in terms of players strategic behavior and manipulability of cost-benefit allocation rules.
dc.fuente.origenIEEE
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/PTC.2019.8810685
dc.identifier.eisbn9781538647226
dc.identifier.isbn9781538647233
dc.identifier.urihttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=8810685
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1109/PTC.2019.8810685
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/64009
dc.information.autorucEscuela de ingeniería ; Sauma Santis, Enzo Enrique ; S/I ; 74184
dc.language.isoen
dc.nota.accesoContenido parcial
dc.publisherIEEE
dc.relation.ispartofIEEE Milan PowerTech (2019 : Milán, Italia)
dc.rightsacceso restringido
dc.subjectResource management
dc.subjectPower system stability
dc.subjectGame theory
dc.subjectStability analysis
dc.subjectTools
dc.subjectCost function
dc.titleManipulability of Cost and Benefit Allocation in Cross-border Electrical Interconnection Projectses_ES
dc.typecomunicación de congreso
sipa.codpersvinculados74184
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