Transcendent Universals and Modal Metaphysics
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Date
2020
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Abstract
This chapter is the first of the Part Two of the book in which Platonic universals are defended. Here it is argued that only transcendent universals are adequate for an actualist modal metaphysics. This argumentation requires a detailed examination of how transcendent universals work in comparison to immanent universals in each of the main actualist conceptions of possible worlds: possible worlds as maximal structural universals, possible worlds as set-theoretic ‘combinations’ of objects and universals, and possible worlds as ‘complete’ maximally consistent novels. In all cases it results that the supposition that only instantiated universals exist is unable to explain the metaphysical possibilities concerning ‘alien’ properties.
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Primitive facts of resemblance, Inductive practices, Resemblance classes of module tropes, Modal metaphysics, Objections against transcendent universals, Transcendent universals