Using List Prices to Collude or to Compete?

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dc.contributor.authorCussen, Diego
dc.contributor.authorMontero, Juan-Pablo
dc.date.accessioned2025-01-20T16:11:53Z
dc.date.available2025-01-20T16:11:53Z
dc.date.issued2024
dc.description.abstractCollusion is deemed unlikely in wholesale markets where upstream suppliers and intermediate buyers privately negotiate discounts off list prices and sales quotas are unfeasible. However, many wholesale markets include both small and large buyers who compete in the retail market. We study the role of publicly announced list prices in this wholesale-retail setting, whether suppliers collude or compete. When suppliers collude, public announcements of list prices extend the possibility of collusion from small to large buyers (the multi-buyer contact effect). When suppliers compete, these announcements provide them with commitment to negotiate better terms with large buyers (the commitment effect).
dc.fuente.origenWOS
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/ej/ueae058
dc.identifier.eissn1468-0297
dc.identifier.issn0013-0133
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueae058
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/90299
dc.identifier.wosidWOS:001282383700001
dc.language.isoen
dc.revistaEconomic journal
dc.rightsacceso restringido
dc.subject.ods09 Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure
dc.subject.odspa09 Industria, innovación e infraestructura
dc.titleUsing List Prices to Collude or to Compete?
dc.typeartículo
sipa.indexWOS
sipa.trazabilidadWOS;2025-01-12
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