Do fiscal transfers affect local democracy?: lessons from Chilean Municipalities

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dc.catalogadorpva
dc.contributor.authorAlberti, Carla
dc.contributor.authorDíaz Rioseco, Diego
dc.contributor.authorRiveros, Ignacio
dc.date.accessioned2023-07-17T20:50:35Z
dc.date.available2023-07-17T20:50:35Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.description.abstractExtant literature concurs that fiscal transfers affect local democracy when they grant subnational governments nontax revenue. Yet there is nonetheless a mismatch between this concept and existing measures, which consider the whole transfers local governments receive, including both tax and nontax revenue. This article studies the Fondo Común Municipal (FCM), the most important intergovernmental grant in Chile, and provides a novel measure of nontax revenue. It uses this measure alongside the whole FCM transfer to test the rentier hypothesis. On the one hand, it shows that both measures increase the incumbent party vote share, although the effect of our measure is smaller. On the other hand, it finds that the FCM transfer has an impact on the probability of reelection and the competitiveness of elections, but this effect disappears when using our measure. Overall, the findings suggest that rents from transfers do not lead to strong electoral dominance in unitary states.
dc.fechaingreso.objetodigital2023-07-17
dc.fuente.origenCambridge University Press
dc.identifier.doi10.1017/lap.2023.16
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2023.16
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/74194
dc.identifier.wosidWOS:001005934000001
dc.information.autorucInstituto de ciencia política; Alberti, Carla; 0000-0002-0679-4716; 141800
dc.information.autorucInstituto de Ciencia Política; Díaz Rioseco, Diego; 0000-0003-3045-3759; 151353
dc.language.isoen
dc.nota.accesoContenido completo
dc.pagina.final26
dc.pagina.inicio1
dc.revistaLatin American Politics and Societyes_ES
dc.rightsacceso abierto
dc.rights.licenseAttribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.subjectSubnational democracyes_ES
dc.subjectFiscal federalismes_ES
dc.subjectRentses_ES
dc.subjectNontax revenuees_ES
dc.subjectDecentralizationes_ES
dc.subjectUnitary stateses_ES
dc.subject.ddc300
dc.subject.deweyCiencias socialeses_ES
dc.subject.ods10 Reduced inequalities
dc.subject.odspa10 Reducción de las desigualdades
dc.titleDo fiscal transfers affect local democracy?: lessons from Chilean Municipalitieses_ES
dc.typeartículo
sipa.codpersvinculados141800
sipa.codpersvinculados151353
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