Punishing mayors who fail the test: How do voters respond to information about educational outcomes?

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dc.catalogadorvzp
dc.contributor.authorCox Alcaino, María Loreto
dc.contributor.authorEyzaguirre, Tafra Sylvia
dc.contributor.authorGallego Yánez, Francisco Antonio
dc.contributor.authorGarcía, Maximiliano
dc.date.accessioned2024-06-03T19:25:58Z
dc.date.available2024-06-03T19:25:58Z
dc.date.issued2024
dc.description.abstractThis paper explores the electoral effects of providing information on the educational outcomes of municipal schools when the mayor is running for reelection. We designed and implemented an experiment in Chile whereby we sent 128,033 letters to voters in 400 randomly selected polling stations prior to the 2016 municipal elections. The letters included information on past test scores for local public schools (levels and changes), and either average or maximum outcomes for comparable municipalities. Our findings do not reveal a relevant average impact of the letters, but when they contain poor educational outcomes, voter turnout decreases, translating almost one to one in decreases in votes for the incumbent mayor. Voters respond to educational results in levels and to letters that have average results as a benchmark. The results are especially strong when poor educational outcomes come as bad news to voters. We also find spillover effects in the municipal council election. Overall, our findings suggest that voters hold politicians accountable when faced to certain (but not all) types of information on their performance. JEL Codes: D72, H75, I25.
dc.fechaingreso.objetodigital2024-09-03
dc.fuente.origenORCID
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103315
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103315
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/86378
dc.identifier.wosidWOS:001252467200001
dc.information.autorucEscuela de Gobierno; Cox Alcaino, Maria Loreto; S/I; 141354
dc.information.autorucInstituto de Economía; Eyzaguirre Tafra, Sylvia; S/I; 1014297
dc.information.autorucFacultad de Economía y Administración; Gallego Yánez, Francisco Antonio; 0000-0002-2252-891X; 94445
dc.issue.numero103315
dc.language.isoen
dc.nota.accesocontenido parcial
dc.revistaJournal of Development Economics
dc.rightsacceso restringido
dc.subject.ddc300
dc.subject.deweyCiencias sociales
dc.subject.ods04 Quality education
dc.subject.ods11 Sustainable cities and communities
dc.subject.odspa04 Educación de calidad
dc.subject.odspa11 Ciudades y comunidades sostenibles
dc.titlePunishing mayors who fail the test: How do voters respond to information about educational outcomes?
dc.typepreprint
sipa.codpersvinculados141354
sipa.codpersvinculados1014297
sipa.codpersvinculados94445
sipa.trazabilidadORCID;2024-06-03
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