Product Lines and Price Discrimination in Markets with Information Frictions

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dc.contributor.authorFabra, Natalia
dc.contributor.authorMontero, Juan-Pablo
dc.date.accessioned2025-01-20T21:12:18Z
dc.date.available2025-01-20T21:12:18Z
dc.date.issued2022
dc.description.abstractA well-known principle in economics is that firms differentiate their product offerings in order to relax competition. However, in this paper we show that information frictions can invalidate this principle. We build a duopolistic competition model of seconddegree price discrimination with information frictions in which (i) an equilibrium always exists with overlapping product qualities, whereas (ii) an equilibrium with nonoverlapping product qualities exists only if both information frictions and the cost of providing high quality are sufficiently small. As a consequence, reasons other than an attempt to soften competition should explain why firms in some cases carry nonoverlapping product lines.
dc.fuente.origenWOS
dc.identifier.doi10.1287/mnsc.2020.3941
dc.identifier.eissn1526-5501
dc.identifier.issn0025-1909
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3941
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/93653
dc.identifier.wosidWOS:000760267000004
dc.issue.numero2
dc.language.isoen
dc.pagina.final1001
dc.pagina.inicio981
dc.revistaManagement science
dc.rightsacceso restringido
dc.subjectapproval
dc.subjectunless otherwise noted
dc.subjectFor more information
dc.subjectcontact permissions@informs
dc.subjectorg
dc.subjectproduct strategy
dc.subjectpricing strategy
dc.subjectsecond-degree price discrimination
dc.subjectsearch
dc.subjectvertical differentiation
dc.subjectretail competition
dc.subject.ods09 Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure
dc.subject.odspa09 Industria, innovación e infraestructura
dc.titleProduct Lines and Price Discrimination in Markets with Information Frictions
dc.typeartículo
dc.volumen68
sipa.indexWOS
sipa.trazabilidadWOS;2025-01-12
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