Monopolization with Must-Haves

dc.contributor.authorIde, Enrique
dc.contributor.authorMontero, Juan-Pablo
dc.date.accessioned2025-01-20T16:11:19Z
dc.date.available2025-01-20T16:11:19Z
dc.date.issued2024
dc.description.abstractAn increasing number of monopolization cases have been constructed around the notion of " must-have" items: products that distributors must carry to "compete effectively." Motivated by these cases, , we consider a multiproduct setting where upstream suppliers sell their products through competing distributors offering one-stop-shopping convenience to consumers. We show the emergence of products that distributors cannot afford not to carry if their rivals do. A supplier of such products can exploit this must-have property, , along with tying and exclusivity provisions, , to monopolize adjacent, , otherwise-competitive markets. Policy interventions that ban tying or exclusivity provisions may prove ineffective or even backfire. ( JEL D43, K21, L13, L14, L42, L81) )
dc.fuente.origenWOS
dc.identifier.doi10.1257/mic.20230018
dc.identifier.eissn1945-7685
dc.identifier.issn1945-7669
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20230018
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/90264
dc.identifier.wosidWOS:001285370500010
dc.issue.numero3
dc.language.isoen
dc.pagina.final320
dc.pagina.inicio284
dc.revistaAmerican economic journal-microeconomics
dc.rightsacceso restringido
dc.subject.ods09 Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure
dc.subject.odspa09 Industria, innovación e infraestructura
dc.titleMonopolization with Must-Haves
dc.typeartículo
dc.volumen16
sipa.indexWOS
sipa.trazabilidadWOS;2025-01-12
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