David Hume Versus Adam Smith: On the Source of Normativity in Moral Sentimentalism

dc.article.number90297
dc.contributor.authorCarrasco, Maria A.
dc.date.accessioned2025-04-15T10:30:28Z
dc.date.available2025-04-15T10:30:28Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.description.abstractDespite the countless similarities between David Hume's and Adam Smith's moral theories, many people have lately argued that the Theory of Moral Sentiments can be read as a critical response to Hume's ethics. In this paper I contend that the most important difference between these sentimentalist philosophers has to do with the source and nature of morality's normative authority, which in turn determines what is a legitimate moral reason or what is morality properly speaking.
dc.description.funderInequality and Sustainability
dc.description.funderMetropolitan Areas of Santiago
dc.description.funderFONDECYT
dc.format.extent26 páginas
dc.fuente.origenWOS
dc.identifier.doi10.21555/top.v0i59.1114
dc.identifier.eissn2007-8498
dc.identifier.issn0188-6649
dc.identifier.pubmedidMEDLINE:19623426
dc.identifier.scopusidScopus_ID:85197748046
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i59.1114
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.uc.cl/handle/11534/103278
dc.identifier.wosidWOS:000612269100011
dc.information.autorucFacultad de Comunicaciones; Carrasco Barraza, Maria Alejandra; S/I; 76166
dc.issue.numero59
dc.language.isoes
dc.nota.accesoSin adjunto
dc.pagina.final366
dc.pagina.inicio341
dc.relation.ispartof49th Annual Meeting of the International-Continence-Society (ICS), SEP 03-06, 2019, Gothenburg, SWEDEN
dc.revistaTOPICOS-REVISTA DE FILOSOFIA
dc.rightsregistro bibliográfico
dc.subjectAdam Smith
dc.subjectDavid Hume
dc.subjectmoral sentimentalism
dc.subjectnormative authority
dc.subjectmoral reasons
dc.subjectSYMPATHY
dc.subjectPOINT
dc.subject.ddc800
dc.subject.deweyLiteraturaes_ES
dc.subject.ods03 Good Health and Well-being
dc.subject.odspa03 Salud y bienestar
dc.titleDavid Hume Versus Adam Smith: On the Source of Normativity in Moral Sentimentalism
dc.typeartículo
dc.volumen137
sipa.codpersvinculados76166
sipa.indexWOS
sipa.trazabilidadCarga WOS-SCOPUS;15-04-2025
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