Browsing by Author "Wajnerman, Paz Abel"

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    Anthropomorphism in social AIs: Some challenges
    (Elsevier Press, 2024) Wajnerman, Paz Abel; Salles, Arleen; Instituto de Éticas Aplicadas, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile; Institute of Neuroethics
    In this chapter, we are concerned with anthropomorphism in social AIs, particularly social chatbots. While not embodied in terms of having a human-like appearance, these chatbots are designed to induce attribution of intentionality and agency to engage users in enhanced interactions. Here we identify and present two strategies used to address the legitimacy of the anthropomorphisation, the intentional creation of human-like traits, of AIs: ontological and pragmatic. We further review some objections to pragmatic attempts to justify the anthropomorphisation of AIs. It is not our goal to argue in favour or against anthropomorphising social chatbots. Rather we examine some persistent concerns and call for more attention to and further research and reflection on the ethical, psychological, and ontological assumptions underlying them.
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    La privacidad mental como fundamento de la identidad y la autonomia relacional
    (2024) Wajnerman, Paz Abel
    En los últimos años, diferentes propuestas han articulado derechos específicos para la regulación de la neurotecnología, conocidos como "neuroderechos". Una preocupación central con respecto a las aplicaciones neurotecnológicas es la privacidad mental, que se refiere a la idea de que debemos tener control sobre el acceso a nuestros datos neuronales y la información sobre nuestros procesos y estados mentales que se puede obtener al analizarlos. Luego de proponer una conceptualización detallada de la privacidad mental, argumentaré que la protección de este derecho es relevante porque se encuentra en la base de dos dimensiones éticas y legales fundamentales de las personas: la identidad y la autonomía. Sostengo que la privacidad mental está presupuesta por la concepción relacional de la identidad, y que esta conexión nos permite identificar algunas limitaciones de las regulaciones actuales sobre la privacidad de los datos. Además, argumentaré que la identidad relacional está presupuesta por la noción de autonomía, lo que pone de relieve dimensiones relacionales de este concepto que no están adecuadamente articuladas en las teorías relacionales actuales sobre la acción autónoma. Esto implica que la protección de la privacidad mental también es necesaria para la protección de esta segunda dimensión ética y legal de las personas.
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    Mental Privacy and Neuroprotection: An Open Debate
    (Springer Cham, 2022) Wajnerman, Paz Abel; López-Silva, Pablo; Universidad de Valparaíso
    Current advances in neurotechnology are allowing the gradual decoding of neural information at the basis of a number of conscious mental states with unprecedented level of accuracy. Such developments, it is suggested, might give scientists the possibility to ‘read minds’, opening the debate about how to protect mental privacy, that is, the control that subjects have over the access to their own neural data and all relevant information about their mental processes and states that can be obtained by analyzing such data. In this chapter, we oppose those that deny the urgent need for a current discussion of this issue, offering some arguments to motivate and inform the debate. Finally, we examine some of the problems contained in the organic approach to mental privacy, namely, the idea that neural data should be protected by the laws for organ transplantation and donation
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    Neurociencia cognitiva
    (Ediciones Uniandes, 2023) Wajnerman, Paz Abel; Instituto de Éticas Aplicadas, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
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    Neurotechnological Applications and the Protection of Mental Privacy: An Assessment of Risks
    (2024) Lopez-Silva, Pablo; Wajnerman, Paz Abel; Molnar-Gabor, Fruzsina
    The concept of mental privacy can be defined as the principle that subjects should have control over the access to their own neural data and to the information about the mental processes and states that can be obtained by analyzing it. Our aim is to contribute to the current debate on mental privacy by identifying the main positions, articulating key assumptions and addressing central arguments. First, we map the different positions found in current literature. We distinguish between those who dismiss concerns about mental privacy and those who endorse them. In this latter group, we establish a further disagreement between conservative and liberal strategies to protect mental privacy. Then, we address the first discussion by articulating and criticizing different skeptical views on mental privacy. Finally, we try to identify what are the unique features of neural data and examine how they may be connected to the ways in which neurotechnological mindreading could put mental privacy at risk. We suggest that even if neural data is unique, it may not require new strategies to protect people from its misuse. However, identifying the special features and risks of neurotechnological mind-reading is necessary for the second discussion on mental privacy to properly take off.