Browsing by Author "Rubini, Loris"

Now showing 1 - 5 of 5
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    Efectos asimétricos de shocks fiscales en el ciclo económico
    (2014) Hernández Villamán, Camila; Mies, Verónica; Rosende R., Francisco; Rubini, Loris; Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Instituto de Economía
    Los modelos de ciclos reales (RBC) tradicionales no pueden reproducir la evidencia emp ri- ca de la existencia de respuestas asim etricas del consumo privado a cambios en el gasto del go- bierno. En este trabajo se intenta reconciliar este tipo de modelos con esos resultados mediante la introducci on de un nivel de consumo m nimo que el agente debe satisfacer. Al contrario de lo que sucede en modelos est andar RBC, el modelo presentado genera elasticidades de susti- tuci on intertemporal del consumo diferentes dependiendo de qu e tan alejado se encuentre el nivel de consumo respecto al de subsistencia. Dada esta dependencia, el efecto de un aumento no anticipado y transitorio en el ingreso de los consumidores (como el producido por un shock de gasto scal) ser a diferente dependiendo la fase del ciclo econ omico: en periodos en el que el PIB se encuentre por debajo de la tendencia, el ingreso extra no anticipado se consume en mayor proporci on porque la disposici on a sustituir consumo presente (y por lo tanto ahorrar) es menor que en periodos en el que el PIB se encuentra sobre su nivel tendencial.
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    Innovation and the Trade Elasticity
    (2014) Rubini, Loris
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    Resource Misallocation from Childcare Policies
    Escobar, Diego ; Lafortune, Jeanne; Rubini, Loris; Tessada, José
    Childcare subsidies often attempt to allow low income families to work, but a problem arises when they generate unforeseen negative general equilibrium consequences. This paper focuses on a law in Chile that forces firms with more than 19 female workers to pay for childcare. We evaluate its effects through a model that features firm and household heterogeneity. Firms differ in productivity, and households in age, marital status, gender, skills, and number of children. In the model, the policy mis-allocates resources, driving firms to stop hiring females once they are close to the threshold. It also selects females with more skills into jobs that pay for childcare, leaving unskilled mothers un-subsidized. We calibrate the model and analyze the effects of this policy via counterfactual. The policy reduces both male and female wages by between 1.5% and 2.1%, and GDP per capita by 1.8%. Most of the change comes from mis-allocation, but some also from capital accumulation, that drops by 1.7%. The policy makes every household worse off, but the largest losers are low income mothers, precisely the group targeted by the policy, who lose up to 2% of consumption equivalent units each period. We evaluate two alternative policies: one currently being considered by the Chilean government that finances childcare through a labor tax and one where all firms must pay for childcare irrespective of size. Only the latter has sizable positive effects, suggesting that a better way to help cover childcare costs would be to extend the mandate to all firms.
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    The redistributive effects of size-dependent childcare policies
    (2024) Escobar, Diego; Lafortune, Jeanne; Rubini, Loris; Tessada, Jose
    Governments often adopt policies to reduce the cost of childcare for working families, but those can distort the allocation of resources. We develop and calibrate a general equilibrium model with firm and household heterogeneity and study the case of Chile, where firms with more than 19 female employees must provide childcare. We find that removing this policy would increase welfare on average by 2.3% of consumption equivalent units over their lifetime. However, the removal would not translate into increases in GDP, in part because of a reduced labor supply. Instead, the main effects of the policy are redistributive, shifting resources away from females towards males. The policy reduces welfare for most females, and these losses are decreasing in income. In particular, low-education single females, who do not rely on a second wage, would gain up to 20% in consumption equivalent units by removing the policy. We propose that alternative childcare financing options would be preferred. Specifically, financing childcare through labor taxes would increase aggregate welfare by over 13%, with the largest gains accruing to single, low-education mothers.