Browsing by Author "Montero, Juan Pablo"

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    A solute transport model for the acid leaching of copper in soil columns
    (1994) Montero, Juan Pablo; Muñoz Pardo, José Francisco; Abeliuk, Roberto; Vauclin, Michel
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    Forward trading and collusion in oligopoly
    (ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE, 2006) Liski, Matti; Montero, Juan Pablo
    We consider an infinitely repeated oligopoly in which at each period firms not only serve the spot market by either competing in prices or quantities but also have the opportunity to trade forward contracts. Contrary to the pro-competitive results of finite-horizon models, we find that the possibility of forward trading allows firms to sustain collusive profits that otherwise would not be possible to achieve. The result holds both for price and quantity competition and follows because (collusive) contracting of future sales is more effective in deterring deviations from the collusive plan than inducing the previously identified pro-competitive effects. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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    "Know thyself": information design with elusive receivers
    (2021) Díaz Titelman, Viviana; Figueroa González, Nicolás Andrés; Montero, Juan Pablo; Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Instituto de Economía
    In some contexts, agents might be uncertain on how their chosen actions payoff. On the other side of the market, firms can use this uncertainty to induce their preferred actions. We develop a dynamic principal-agent model in which the agent strategically chooses whether or not (and to what extent) to inform herself on an unknown parameter of her utility function. Information on this parameter is valued tomorrow but is costly today. We find that for certain prior beliefs of said parameter, information acquisition is optimal. The principal has an objective function that depends on the agent's decision and knows the agent's optimal strategy. So, he intervenes in her chosen actions by designing distributions of posterior beliefs. In particular, we explore three instruments for the principal that determine (i) the precision of the information the agent acquires and (ii) the chances that the agent chooses to get informed.
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    OUTPUT-EXPANDING COLLUSION IN THE PRESENCE OF A COMPETITIVE FRINGE
    (WILEY-BLACKWELL PUBLISHING, INC, 2010) Montero, Juan Pablo; Ignacio Guzman, Juan
    Following the structure of many commodity markets, we consider a few large firms and a competitive fringe of many small suppliers choosing quantities in an infinite-horizon setting subject to demand shocks. We show that a collusive agreement among the large firms may not only bring an output contraction but also an output expansion (relative to the non-collusive output level). The latter occurs during booms and is due to the strategic substitutability of quantities. We also find that the time at which maximal collusion is most difficult to sustain can be either at booms or recessions. The international copper cartel of 1935-39 is used to illustrate some of our results.
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    The efficiency and robustness of allowance banking in the US Acid Rain Program
    (INT ASSOC ENERGY ECONOMICS, 2007) Ellerman, A. Denny; Montero, Juan Pablo
    This paper provides an empirical evaluation of the efficiency of allowance banking in the nationwide market for sulfur dioxide (SO2) emission allowances that was created by the U.S. Acid Rain Program. We develop a model of efficient banking, select appropriate parameter values, and evaluate the efficiency of observed temporal pattern of abatement based on aggregate data from the first eight years of the Acid Rain Program. Contrary to the general opinion that banking in this program has been excessive, we find that it has been reasonably efficient. We also identify the erroneous assumptions underlying the earlier view and the conditions required for efficient banking to exist independently of changes in the counterfactual, an attribute we call robustness. These results show that firms use banking provisions in a rational and predictable way and that, at least in the US Acid Rain Program, there is no support for the often expressed concern that banked permits will be used all at once to create emissions spikes.