Browsing by Author "Lefort, Fernando"

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    Board independence, firm performance and ownership concentration: Evidence from Chile
    (ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC, 2008) Lefort, Fernando; Urzua, Francisco
    What determines the composition of companies' boards in the context of high ownership concentration? Are independent directors important as an internal governance mechanism in companies with high ownership concentration? Do markets favor companies whose controlling shareholders use voting rights to elect professional directors?
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    Do markets penalize agency conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders? Evidence from Chile
    (BLACKWELL PUBLISHING, 2007) Lefort, Fernando; Walker, Eduardo
    Using a sample of Chilean listed firms with widespread presence of economic conglomerates that use pyramid structures to control affiliated companies, we find that firms where controlling shareholders have higher coincidence between cash and control rights are persistently more valued by the market. We carefully check that our results are not driven by omitted variable biases and control for reverse causation using a feature of Chilean Corporations Law that provides an exogenous instrument for ownership concentration.