Browsing by Author "Guzman, Ricardo Andres"

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    Institutions influence preferences: Evidence from a common pool resource experiment
    (ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV, 2008) Rodriguez Sickert, Carlos; Guzman, Ricardo Andres; Cardenas, Juan Camilo
    We model the dynamic effects of external enforcement on the exploitation of a common pool resource. Fitting Our model to experimental data we find that institutions influence social preferences. We solve two puzzles in the data: the increase and later erosion of cooperation when commoners vote against the imposition of a fine, and the high deterrence power of low fines. When fines are rejected, internalization of a social norm explains the increased cooperation; violations (accidental or not), coupled with reciprocal preferences, account for the erosion. Low fines stabilize cooperation by preventing a spiral of negative reciprocation. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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    When in Rome, do as the Romans do: the coevolution of altruistic punishment, conformist learning, and cooperation
    (ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC, 2007) Guzman, Ricardo Andres; Rodriguez Sickert, Carlos; Rowthorn, Robert
    We model the coevolution of behavioral strategies and social learning rules in the context of a cooperative dilemma, a situation in which individuals must decide whether or not to subordinate their own interests to those of the group. There are two learning rules in our model, conformism and payoff-dependent imitation, which evolve by natural selection, and three behavioral strategies, cooperate, defect, and cooperate, plus punish defectors, which evolve under the influence of the prevailing learning rules. Group and individual level selective pressures drive evolution.