Browsing by Author "Christoff, Kalina"

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    Creativity and the Wandering Mind: Spontaneous and Controlled Cognition
    (Academic Press, 2020) Barnett, Paul Joseph; Kaufman, James C.; Barr, Nathaniel; Beaty, Roger; Seli, Paul; Zedelius, Claire M.; Schooler, Jonathan W.; Palmiero, Massimiliano; Villena González, Mario; Cosmelli, Diego; Prochazkova, Luisa; Hommel, Bernhard; Jay Lynn, Steven; Polizzi, Craig; Miskovic, Vladimir; Aksen, Damla; Woolley, Jacqueline D.; Bunce, Louise; Boerger, Elizabeth A.; Whitebread, David; O’Sullivan, Lisha; Russ, Sandra W.; Beghetto, Ronald A.; Schuh, Kathy L.; Dobson, Charles; Christoff, Kalina; Preiss, David D.; Colm Hogan, Patrick; Preiss Contreras, David Daniel; Cosmelli, Diego; Kaufman, James C.
    Creativity and the Wandering Mind: Spontaneous and Controlled Cognition summarizes research on the impact of mind wandering and cognitive control on creativity, including imagination, fantasy and play. Most coverage in this area has either focused on the negative consequences of mind wandering on focused problem solving or the positive effect of mindfulness, but not on the positive consequences of mind wandering. This volume bridges that gap. Research indicates that most people experience mind wandering during a large percentage of their waking time, and that it is a baseline default mode of brain function during the awake but resting state. This volume explores the different kinds of mind wandering and its positive impact on imagination, play, problem-solving, and creative production.
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    Specifying the self for cognitive neuroscience
    (2011) Christoff, Kalina; Cosmelli, Diego; Legrand, Dorothée; Thompson, Evan
    Cognitive neuroscience investigations of self-experience have mainly focused on the mental attribution of features to the self (self-related processing). In this paper, we highlight another fundamental, yet neglected, aspect of self-experience, that of being an agent. We propose that this aspect of self-experience depends on self-specifying processes, ones that implicitly specify the self by implementing a functional self/non-self distinction in perception, action, cognition and emotion. We describe two paradigmatic cases - sensorimotor integration and homeostatic regulation - and use the principles from these cases to show how cognitive control, including emotion regulation, is also self-specifying. We argue that externally directed, attention-demanding tasks, rather than suppressing self-experience, give rise to the self-experience of being a cognitive-affective agent. We conclude with directions for experimental work based on our framework.