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  1. Home
  2. Browse by Author

Browsing by Author "Bialek, Janusz"

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    Can cross-border transmission expansion lead to fair and stable cooperation? Northeast Asia case analysis
    (2019) Churkin, Andrey; Pozo, David; Bialek, Janusz; Korgin, Nikolay; Sauma Santis, Enzo Enrique
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    Enhancing the Stability of Coalitions in Cross-Border Transmission Expansion Planning
    (2022) Churkin, Andrey; Sauma Santis, Enzo Enrique; Pozo, David; Bialek, Janusz; Korgin, Nikolay
    Cooperative Game Theory has recently attracted attention in power systems research as a tool for expansion planning analysis. However, this analysis is usually performed in an ex-post manner, i.e., planning and operation decisions are separated from the allocation mechanisms themselves. The existing paradigm implies selecting an allocation rule (say, the Shapley value) to share the value of cooperation and verifying its rationality (e.g., by checking the Core of the cooperative game). Additional metrics of coalitional stability are omitted. Such an ex-post approach could lead to coalitional stability issues, which may hamper the establishment of cooperation. For example, there could be a severe imbalance in players' positions, and the contribution of some players could be underestimated in the grand coalition. This paper proposes a bilevel optimization framework for explicitly incorporating Cooperative Game Theory principles into transmission expansion planning problems. Using a simple 4-system case study and a real-world case of cross-border power interconnections in Northeast Asia, we demonstrate that it is possible to make planning decisions in an anticipatory manner subject to the stability of coalitions. The identified expansion plans with enhanced coalitional stability indicate the ways of making parties more equally involved in electricity trading. Finally, we discuss the applicability of the bilevel TEP model, the properties of resulting cooperative games, and the compromise between coalitional stability and economic efficiency in transmission expansion planning.
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    Review of Cooperative Game Theory applications in power system expansion planning
    (2021) Churkin, Andrey; Bialek, Janusz; Pozo, David; Sauma Santis, Enzo Enrique; Korgin, Nikolay
    In recent years, mechanisms of cooperation in power systems have attracted increasing attention from academia and industry. Such mechanisms require sharing the benefits of cooperation among participants based on some rational and obvious principles. In this regard, Cooperative Game Theory (CGT) provides a rich theoretical background for the analysis of projects where participants (called players) can make collective actions to obtain mutual benefits. CGT concepts not only solve the subsequent allocation problems but also reveal the bargaining power of players and estimate the stability of cooperation over a project. In this paper, we aim to classify and promote CGT applications in power systems. While covering a broad range of applications (such as cost and benefit allocation, transmission pricing, projects ranking, allocation of power losses), we pay particular attention to power system expansion planning. We first introduce an illustrative example of cooperation in transmission expansion planning and discuss the applicability of CGT solution concepts. To give a complete picture of the state of the art, we perform a citation network analysis of more than 3000 related studies from 1996 to 2020. Exploiting the graph layout and modularity algorithms, we identify the main research communities and highlight their contributions. We found that significant progress has been achieved in developing mechanisms of cooperation in power systems based on CGT solution concepts. However, several challenges and limitations of these concepts still have to be overcome, such as scalability, nonconvexity of cooperative games, coalitions formation assumption, ex-post game-theoretic analysis, incompleteness and manipulability of information. The overview presented in this paper and the citation network analysis performed can help scientists and engineers in comprehending the CGT solution concepts, discovering novel applications for power systems, and contributing to this promising multidisciplinary research direction.

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